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 Introduction 
 
The relationship between the EU and the Member States in the field of external representation has 
always been contentious. It is even more so post-Lisbon that the EU has an explicit legal personality 
under Article 47 TEU, something which has boosted its claim to establish a unified presence in 
international fora. Recent experience from CJEU jurisprudence suggests that when the Treaty falls 
short of providing guidance about external representation, the implied powers doctrine is often 
relied upon by the EU Institutions to prescribe a duty upon the Member States to be loyal to the EU 
when they act externally. This unwritten rule is there to ensure that Member States do not engage in 
conduct which may contravene the EU position. The systematisation of this positive duty has 
spurred the EU’s appetite for unified representation further, especially where the Treaty is silent 
about the position to be adopted on behalf of the EU in an international organisation to which the 
Member States are signatories but the EU itself is not a party. 
 
While, however, certain omissions in the Treaty allow for flexibility and innovation, they cause 
certain discomfort to the Member States who are, and perhaps rightly so, worried about the 
preservation of the status quo with regard to the conduct of their foreign policy, an essential task for 
any sovereign power. With this background in mind, the O.I.V. dispute between Germany and the 
Council (a case involving the external dimension of the common organisation of the wine markets)2 
that is analysed hereafter is indicative of the strife between status quo and innovation or further 
integration. It is a case which throws light into the question of who has competence (the national 
governments or the EU legislature) to prescribe the permissible course of action of Member States 
in a situation where the conduct of an international organisation, to which the EU is not a party, has 
profound legal implications for the EU legal order.  
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Surrey. 
2 Internally this area is largely regulated by the EU legislature in the exercise of its competence under Article 43 TFEU. 
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Factual and Legal Background 
 
The case concerned the agreement between the EU and the Member States in the area of activity of 
the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (O.I.V). The O.I.V is an intergovernmental 
organisation with 45 countries-members (21 of which are EU Member States) and competence in 
the area of vine-based products. Although it was set up in 2011, its history goes back to 1924 where 
it was first launched as the International Vine and Wine Office. It is important for the narrative that 
although the majority of EU Member States are members of the organisation, the EU itself is not a 
party to it. This fact is crucial insofar as the O.I.V has the power to set international oenological 
standards viz. practices and methods of analysis. More specifically, it draws up relevant 
recommendations and monitors their implementation in liaison with its members. All in all, the 
O.I.V has competence to harmonise existing oenological standards and prepare new ones with a 
view to improving the production and marketing conditions of wine products, taking also into 
account consumer interests.  
 
From its part, the EU has acknowledged the OIV's expertise and referred to its oenological 
recommendations in a number of EU Regulations.3 What is more, almost seven years ago, the 
Commission took steps to negotiate EU-O.I.V. accession pursuant to Article 8 of the relevant O.I.V 
agreement.4. Yet, due to lack of majority in the Council, the EU is yet to join the O.I.V. As such, the 
EU Member States parties to the O.I.V coordinated unilaterally their positions within the relevant 
working group on wines and alcohol. 
 
A dispute arose when in 2012 the Council adopted a decision establishing the EU position with 
regard to certain resolutions to be voted in the framework of the O.I.V.5 The legal bases for this 
Decision were Article 43 TFEU on common agricultural policy and Article 218 (9) TFEU which 
provides the procedure with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. 
The decision was adopted under qualified majority in the Council with Germany voting against it. 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation No 479/2008, (6) which entered into force on 1 August 2008, introduced dynamic references to 
OIV resolutions into secondary law for the first time. (7) By Council Regulation No 491/2009, (8) those provisions on 
the common organisation of the market in wine were incorporated into Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 (Single 
CMO Regulation). (9) 
4 This provision stresses that ‘An international intergovernmental organisation may participate in or be a member of the 
O.I.V and may help to fund the O.I.V under conditions determined, on a case by case basis, by the General Assembly 
on a proposal from the Executive Committee.’ 
5 Council Document 11436/12, Council Decision establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of the European 
Union with regard to certain resolutions to be voted in the framework of the International Organisation for Vine and 
Wine (OIV) – Adoption (2012). 
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Therefore, Germany brought an action for annulment of the Council decision arguing that it was 
wrongly based on Article 218 (9) TFEU as a procedural legal basis. Two main arguments were 
made against the adoption of the contested decision. Broadly speaking, both arguments concerned 
the context in which Article 218 (9) was employed as a correct legal basis for the EU to establish its 
diplomatic presence in the O.I.V. and exercise its competences effectively. 
 
The first argument brought forward by Germany concerned a strict literal interpretation of the kind 
of situation that the procedure laid down in Article 218 (9) TFEU applies. It was established that the 
provision constitutes a lex specials in the context of the conclusion of agreements between the EU 
and third countries or international organisations under Article 218 (1) TFEU. It was also stressed 
that the provision can only be utilised by the EU legislature in order to establish the EU’s position 
in an international organisation that concerns the EU itself. It is, therefore, inappropriate as a legal 
basis to establish the EU’s position in a body that the EU is not a member. Indeed it is common 
practice that, outside of the EU, Member States participate in various international organisations by 
negotiating separate bilateral agreements. The argument was, therefore, that since the EU has not 
yet availed of the opportunity to become party to the O.I.V, the Council had no authority to adopt a 
decision based on Article 218 (9) TFEU in relation to the representation of the Member States in the 
O.I.V.  
 
The second argument made by Germany was predicated on the nature of the acts that Article 218 
(9) TFEU covers. Again, using a literal interpretation of Article 218 (9), it was stressed that only 
‘acts having legal effects’ - i.e. acts binding under international law are covered by this provision. It 
is clear that O.I.V. resolutions, which the contested decision addressed by establishing a unified EU 
position, are not such acts. They are mere recommendations. Referring to the EU’s reliance upon 
the O.I.V’s recommendations in a number of Regulations, it was pointed out that even EU 
secondary legislation was not sufficient to confer O.I.V. resolutions effects which are binding under 
international law.   
 
The main counter-argument expressed by the Council and the Commission in defence of the EU 
decision which, in their view, justified recourse to Article 218 (9) TFEU was that the provision 
must be applied where the activity of a body set up by an agreement under international law falls 
within the competence of the EU. They emphasised that Article 218 (9) TFEU shall provide the 
procedural basis for EU external action especially when the EU is exercising its exclusive 
competence pursuant to Article 3 (2) TFEU (i.e. in areas covered by the relevant O.I.V. oenological 
recommendations listed in the contested decision, since they are likely to affect common EU rules). 
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Accordingly, the application of Article 218 (9) TFEU ‘by analogy’ was the only way, according to 
the EU Institutions, of ensuring that the EU and its Member States retain the ability to act in the 
areas which fall strictly within their competence.6 
 
Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón opined that Article 218 (9) TFEU does not provide a suitable legal 
basis for the decision in the present case. He pointed to the fact that, contrary to other international 
organisations which may preclude membership to the EU for reasons of international law,7 the EU 
is not excluded from joining the O.I.V. Such membership would be ‘the most natural way for it to 
exercise its competences effectively’.8 By contrast to the EU Institutions, he opposed a teleological 
interpretation of Article 218 (9) TFEU. He, therefore, sided with Germany explaining that the 
contested Council decision must be annulled.  
 
With reference to the first argument made by Germany, the Advocate General opined that 
Article 218 (9) TFEU has certain limitations which are unamenable to change. He stressed that 
Article 218 (9) ‘is based on the assumption that the EU must be a party to the agreement setting up 
the body referred to in that provision.’9 Inter alia, he argued that EU Institutions’ contention that 
other paragraphs of Article 218 TFEU (namely paragraph 11) apply to agreements not signed by the 
EU is not a sufficient ground to widen up the scope of Article 218 (9) TFEU so that it becomes 
applicable to all agreements concluded by the Member States without the EU’s participation.10  
 
With regard to the second argument expressed by Germany, the Advocate General explained that 
the phrase ‘having legal effects’ in Article 218 (9) TFEU covers acts which must have binding force 
in international law. As such, it was clearly not intended to be applied to situations such as that in 
the case at hand. He also raised an issue of horizontal competence with regard to the participation of 
the European Parliament in the conclusion of international agreements. He stated that the 
application by analogy of Article 218 (9) TFEU will diminish the European Parliament’s 
                                                 
6 This term was used by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion on the case (Case C‑399/12 Case C‑399/12 
Germany v Council, nyr) delivered on 29 April 2014, para 101. 
7 For instance, only sovereign states can become UN members. See on EU-UN relation J. Wouters and A. Chané, 
Brussels Meets Westphalia: The European Union and the United Nations (August 1, 2014). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509914.  
8 AG Opinion, para 107. 
9 AG Opinion, para 83. 
10 AG Opinion, para 75-78. 
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participation rights because under the provision its role is only to be informed. Clearly, this 
parameter was overlooked by the Council and the Commission. 
 
Judgment of the Court 
 
In its decision, delivered on 7 October 2014, the CJEU held against Germany and did not follow the 
Advocate General’s opinion.  
 
With regard to the first argument made by Germany, the CJEU held that the fact that the EU is not a 
party to the O.I.V. Agreement does not prevent it from applying Article 218 (9) TFEU. It 
interpreted Article 218 (9) TFEU teleologically holding that the provision ‘intends to establish a 
procedural framework which allows the EU’s position in international organisations to be defined - 
even in the context of international agreements to which it is not a party - where the acts to be 
adopted are to be incorporated subsequently into EU law.’11 The CJEU, therefore effectively linked 
the first (context) and the second (content) argument made by Germany against the adoption of the 
contested decision.  
 
In the mind of EU legislators, the competence to resort to Article 218 (9) TFEU in the present 
situation was justified by merely relying upon the legal effect that O.I.V. recommendations 
produced internally. The CJEU stressed that it is indeed possible for non-binding international 
recommendations to produce legal effects within the EU via the provisions of EU law which 
enforce them. This is exactly the case with the O.I.V.’s oenological recommendations - they 
produce legal effects within the EU by virtue of the fact that the EU legislature will turn them into 
EU legislation. As such, Article 218 (9) TFEU (which makes no reference to whether the EU must 
be a party to an ‘agreement’) was correctly utilised outside its usual context. An open interpretation 
of the provision assisted the EU to establish a unified position to be adopted on its behalf in the 
O.I.V. as well as every other organisation set up by an international agreement to which the EU is 
not a party.12 
 
All in all, the CJEU established that first, the positions to be adopted on the EU’s behalf does not 
imply that the EU has to be a party to the agreement which sets up an international body. Second, 
                                                 
11 Judgment of the CJEU, Case C‑399/12 Germany v Council, 7 October 2014, nyr, para 41. 
12 The CJEU emphasised that it is not unusual for the EU to adopt a position on its behalf in a body set up by that 
agreement through, for instance, the Member States which are party to that agreement acting jointly in its interest. It 
cited Case C‑45/07 Commission v Greece, paras 30-31; Opinion 2/91, para 5 to reinforce its argument. 
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the CJEU set a principle for the future. Suffice, therefore, to establish that the acts which an 
international body adopts have effects in the EU legal order. It is irrelevant, for the purpose of EU 
law, whether or not these acts produce effects in the international legal order at large.13  The EU can 
clearly adopt a position - It does not matter whether it is party to an agreement or has formal status 
to an organisation. 
 
Comment  
 
Implications of the O.I.V judgment 
 
The O.I.V. judgment confirms the EU’s competence to establish a unified position to be adopted on 
its behalf with regard to the recommendations of an international organisation, in view of the 
latter’s direct impact on the EU acquis in its area of application. The CJEU addressed (albeit 
perhaps unsatisfactorily) a number of questions about the status in EU law of international 
agreements concluded by EU Member States which for some time remained subject to 
speculation.14 For instance, the CJEU threw some light on the degree of agency expected from 
Member States in the exercise of their foreign policy in international fora that the EU does not 
participate in any particular shape or form.  
 
Indeed, prior to the O.I.V. case Member States were partially uncertain as to how far they can 
proceed to adopt positions which would affect EU law or to what extent they are required to oppose 
a recommendation from an organisation that they are members which is likely to alter the EU 
acquis. Following the O.I.V. judgment the CJEU recalling previous practice confirmed that even in 
organisations that the EU is not a member, Member States still need to operate as agents of the EU 
and keep in line with their obligations that flow from EU membership.15 This is, of course, not the 
position in all cases but merely when the issue of an international agreement falls within an area of 
EU competence. It is only under these circumstances that the EU can legitimately exercise its 
                                                 
13 Judgment of the CJEU, para 44. 
14 Especially following the repeal (by the Treaty of Maastricht) of former Article 116 EEC which provided a legal basis 
for a common action by the Member States in cases where the Community could not exercise its powers within the 
framework of certain international organisations. In particular, this provision prevented individual actions by Member 
States within the framework of international organisations of an economic character. The Community Institutions were 
charged with the task of coordinating common action in this situation. See for a detailed overview of the impact of 
agreements concluded by EU Member States which are relevant to EU law: A. Rosas, ‘The Status in EU Law of 
International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States’ (2011) 34 (5) Fordham International Law Journal 1304. 
15 See above, note 11. 
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competence under Article 218 (9) TFEU by establishing the position to be adopted on its behalf in 
the organisation set up by the international agreement in question.  
 
The O.I.V. decision has already been influential. Almost a week after it delivered its O.I.V. 
judgment, the CJEU took a similar stance in relation to Article 218 (11) TFEU, concerning 
Advisory Opinions on future agreements. In Opinion 1/13, the Luxembourg judges opined that the 
accession of a non-EU country to the Hague Convention on child abduction fell within the EU’s 
exclusive competence (on international abduction of children).16 Similar to the O.I.V. case, the EU 
is not a party to the Hague Convention but its Member States are. The important difference, 
however, is that the EU is not a signatory to the Convention because, pursuant to Article 38 of the 
Convention, membership to the Hague Convention is only open to States. This did not stop the 
CJEU from claiming that EU external competence ‘may [also] be exercised through the 
intermediary of the Member States acting in the EU’s interest.’17  
 
According to the CJEU, echoing the Council, Member States should demonstrate agency by 
depositing declarations of acceptance in relation to the accession of eight non-EU countries to the 
Hague Convention. Pursuant to the Council’s proposal such declarations would be in the EU’s 
interest. It was the disagreement of Member States to accept such a legal obligation that led the 
Commission to request the advisory opinion at hand under Article 218 (11) TFEU. Not unlike 
O.I.V., however, the CJEU relished the chance to point to the overlap between the provisions of the 
Convention and those laid down by an EU Regulation on the international abduction of children.18 
It claimed that the EU’s exclusive competence extends to the entirety of the Hague Convention and 
that its provisions affected the meaning, scope and effectiveness of the rules laid down by the EU 
on matters of parental responsibility. The latter observation was particularly important vis-à-vis the 
circumstances under which the EU can establish exclusive competence under Article 3 (2) TFEU. 
 
Agency as a quasi-constitutional principle in the conduct of EU external relations 
 
Taking the above findings into account, it shall be highlighted that what we can broadly refer to as 
'agency' has become a key component in the conduct of EU external relations. Member States need 
to acknowledge that when the EU is competent to act on a matter they shall demonstrate a certain 
                                                 
16 Opinion 1/13 of the Court, 14 October 2014, nyr. The EU has internal competence under Article 81 (3) TFEU (family 
law). It has also exercised this competence by adopting Regulation 2201/2003 (see below). 
17 Ibid, para 44. 
18 Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L 338/0001 
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degree of support to assist it in making its position known and its voice heard externally. The O.I.V. 
case has helped to ascertain that establishing its external position is all the more important for the 
EU in cases where it does not have a platform to make its opinion known to an international 
organisation. Agency has its roots in the duty of sincere cooperation or loyalty which, ever since 
ERTA, has become an essential component of the external dimension of EU law and the 
development of EU implied competences.19 More specifically, the CJEU has often found in the 
principle of loyalty an obligation to provide a particular result or, more accurately, a duty to abstain 
from taking action which may be in conflict with EU law.  
  
The CJEU's past jurisprudence suggests that agency also derives from the requirement of uniformity 
in the international representation of the EU – a key objective in EU external relations.20 A good 
illustration of the above point can be found in the CJEU's judgment in Commission v Greece. There 
the CJEU held that Greece had acted in breach of its Treaty obligations by submitting to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) a unilateral proposal on maritime safety relating to two 
conventions binding on the Member States but not upon the EU which is not an IMO member.21 
Again, it is important to mention for the purpose of this analysis that (unlike with the O.I.V.) the 
EU is not a member of the IMO - not by choice but because IMO membership is only open to 
States. Even though all EU Member States are members of the IMO, the CJEU prohibited them 
from submitting to the IMO positions on matters within the sphere of transport which fall squarely 
within EU exclusive competence. In this regard, the point of contention was that the Greek proposal 
would have led to the adoption of new IMO rules. Greece's conduct would have, therefore, 
jeopardised EU exclusive competence on transport policy (including enhancing ship and port 
facility security) as it would have been disruptive to an existing EU Regulation which gave the EU 
sole competence to assume international obligations on the matter.22  
 
As it was expected, the CJEU was criticised for the coercive character of its decision in Commission 
v Greece - especially for extending the scope of its ERTA doctrine to a state’s proposal initiating a 
                                                 
19 Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263. See on implied powers and on how the CJEU has reaffirmed its 
ERTA doctrine: T. Konstadinides, ‘EU Foreign Policy under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification Drawbacks 
and Constitutional Limitations’ (2014) 39 (4) European Law Review 511-530.  
20 See S. Blockmans and R. Wessel, ’Principles and Practices of EU External Representation’ (eds.) CLEER Working 
Paper 2012/15/ 
21 Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece (IMO) [2009] ECR I-701. The Conventions in question were International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code. 
22 Regulation 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security [2004] OJ L 129/6. The Regulation had already 
integrated the relevant parts of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code regarding maritime standards. 
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process which could have led to the adoption of new international rules.23 It was immaterial for the 
CJEU whether those rules that could have been adopted by the IMO would have been binding upon 
the EU. Most importantly perhaps, the IMO judgment is forceful because the CJEU shed more light 
on the nature of the duty of loyalty as well as the obligations of Member States springing from their 
membership in an international organisation to which the EU is not related. The CJEU inflated the 
duty of loyalty to ensure that EU competence may nonetheless be exercised by the Member States 
in a similar context acting as agents of the EU interest. 
 
Subsequently, the CJEU developed further its principles on the EU’s external representation, in 
Commission v Sweden. This time the dispute was in the context of an area of shared competence.24 
The CJEU held that by unilaterally proposing that a chemical substance (perfluoroctane sulfonate: 
PFOS) be listed in Annex A to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Sweden 
failed to fulfil its loyalty obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU. The CJEU established that where the 
subject matter of a convention falls partly within the competence of the EU and partly within that of 
the Member States, it is imperative to ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the 
EU Institutions. Such cooperation should take place both in the process of negotiation and 
conclusion, and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. Therefore, in this case loyalty 
was given a pre-emptive effect to block Member States from undertaking any action that could 
potentially undermine the objectives of the Treaties. The duty of loyalty transcended its original 
meaning (under Article 4 (3) TEU) and became synonymous to a duty of agency or abstention (in 
this particular case) even if the competence at issue was neither exclusive ab initio nor pre-emptive 
through the application of ERTA. 
 
Indeed, the use of a best endeavours obligation or an obligation of result in the abovementioned 
cases was imposed upon Member States to discard any inconsistencies in the EU’s external 
relations approach. Yet the approach of the CJEU is not fully satisfactory because, by emphasising 
on an abstract duty of agency, it appears to be blurring the procedural duties of Member States 
under the principle of loyalty as an obligation of conduct. More often than not, Member States will 
be in an awkward position because even if they have the best of intentions, they will struggle to 
foresee when their action or inaction will upset the EU’s constitutional balance. Although the cases 
mentioned, the O.I.V judgment inclusive, are confined to the specific legal context set out by the 
individual treaty provisions in question, they are sufficient to substantiate broader conclusions about 
                                                 
23 See for a detailed analysis and critique of the case: M. Cremona, ‘Extending the Reach of the AETR Principle: 
Comment on Commission v Greece’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 754. 
24 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] OJ C161/3. 
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the CJEU vis-a-vis the imposition of a general (abstract) agency obligation upon the Member 
States.  
 
Taking into account the CJEU’s preemptive approach towards Member States in exercising a 
competence (often in compliance with EU law), it becomes clear why Germany brought a case 
against the Council with reference to the O.I.V proposal. It appears that the dispute concerned more 
of a question of principle (rather than one on legal basis or external competence) as to whether the 
EU can adopt a position vis-à-vis an international organisation to which it is not a party. The 
discomfort that certain Member States have experienced with regard to the doctrines developed by 
the CJEU (and the poor reasoning that often characterises such development) is likely to generate 
more litigation, especially given that in the O.I.V. case Germany was supported in its claim by other 
Member States including the Netherlands and the UK that have recently become more reluctant 
towards European integration. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Not only does the dispute between Germany and the Council in the O.I.V. continues the saga on the 
relational impact of pie-sharing in EU external relations law and the gradual broadening of the areas 
belonging to EU exclusive competence. It is also noteworthy in relation to the formulation of a 
uniform EU position which concerns the conduct of international organisations to which Member 
States are parties insofar as the functioning of such organisations may impact upon the operation of 
the EU. In this regard, the O.I.V. case is not only controversial because of its immediate outcome 
but because of its progeny which confirms the CJEU's incremental interference beyond the way 
Member States choose to exercise their foreign policy outside the context of their EU membership. 
Indeed, the CJEU’s interference with the membership of EU Member States in international 
organisations will also impact upon the relations between the EU and international organisations in 
general as well as the latter’s operation.   
 
Following the trail of CJEU judgments on EU external competence, it becomes transparent that the 
EU is not encouraging Member States to adopt a double-hatted approach in the conduct of their 
foreign policy. Above all, they are EU Member States. As such, agency and comity (the derivatives 
of sincere cooperation) should be their guiding light. The question is whether the current position 
expressed by the CJEU in the O.I.V. decision carries unpredictable ramifications for the 
morphological development of the EU’s external constitution. The CJEU comes across as 
unprepared and rather unwilling to recognise the full implications of EU Member States’ 
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membership in other international organisations which, similar to the EU, they also prescribe 
obligations and commitments for these states and their governments. Even worse for the autonomy 
of the Member States, the EU seems to be holding international organisations hostage to its own 
constitutional specificities.25  Internally, this insular approach is capable of boosting the EU’s self-
confidence levels in the region as a normative power. Externally, however, the EU’s approach 
paints a rather negative image – one based on a single overarching objective which does not always 
correspond to the preferences of its Member States vis-à-vis their external representation in other 
international organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See more recently the CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 (EU-ECHR accession), 18 December 2014, nyr where the CJEU stressed 
inter alia that ‘the agreement [2013 accession treaty to the ECHR]… fails to have regard to the specific characteristics 
of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU in CFSP matters.’ 
